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Abstract
Alice’s computational power is bounded; Bob’s is not. We describe a pure state
verication procedure by which, if Bob is condent of Alice’s computational bound, he can
be condent of receiving pure states in a certain class from her, while obtaining no further
information about the states. By using this procedure, we obtain two simple and practical
quantum bit commitment protocols by which Alice and Bob can commit bits to each other.
The commitments are permanently secure against cheating by either party, conditional on
the temporary bound on Alice’s computational power. Random strings committed in this
way at present can be used as a resource for secure bit commitment even in a hypothetical
future era in which no temporary computational bounds can condently be estimated.




Quantum information, unlike classical information, can be used to send messages
between two previously isolated parties, encrypted in a way that is believed to be uncondi-
tionally secure | that is, the probability of successfully eavesdropping, by employing any
technology that respects the known laws of physics, can be made arbitrarily small.[1,2] Pro-
tocols have been proposed for carrying out several other cryptographic tasks by quantum
means, but none to date has been shown to be unconditionally secure.
The case of quantum bit commitment is particularly interesting. In classical bit com-
mitment protocols, one party, Alice, supplies an encoded bit to another, Bob. Alice tries to
ensure that Bob cannot decode the bit until she reveals further information, while convinc-
ing Bob that she was genuinely committed all along. That is, Bob must be convinced that
the protocol does not allow two dierent decodings of the bit which leave Alice free to reveal
either 0 or 1, as she wishes. All classical bit commitment schemes are in principle insecure
against cheating by one or other of the parties, though very good practical security can be
attained. Several quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed.[e.g.2,3,4,5] The
BCJL scheme[3] was claimed, and for a time believed, to be unconditionally secure: it was
thought that it could be demonstrated that, if quantum theory is universally valid, then
the probabilities of Alice successfully cheating and of Bob decoding the bit can both be
made arbitrarily small.
The insecurity of the BCJL scheme was rst demonstrated by Mayers.[6,7,8] That a
large class of quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure was shown independently by
Lo and Chau,[9,10] and Mayers.[7,8,11] As Mayers showed,[7,8] the intuition underlying
these proofs extends to a more general class of schemes, including BCJL, in which the
information available to Bob about the encoded bit is small but non-zero. From these
results, Mayers[7] and Lo and Chau[10] conclude that unconditionally secure quantum bit
commitment is impossible.
This has led to some gloom over the potential for new \post Cold War" applications
of quantum cryptography, involving the transfer or trading of information between two
or more parties who wish to retain more privacy than classical cryptography can guaran-
tee. Lo and Chau, for instance, take their arguments as a strong indication that, despite
widespread early optimism, realistic post Cold War applications of quantum cryptography
simply do not exist.[10]
Several reasons are given. Bit commitment is a relatively simple cryptographic task,
and some more interesting tasks, such as oblivious transfer, all-or-nothing disclosure of
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secrets, and certain types of multi-party computation, are known to be stronger, in the
sense that they can also be used to perform bit commitment. Bit commitment also tends,
in classical cryptography, to be used as a building block for more complicated protocols:
it may be hard to carry out many interesting tasks without bit commitment, even if they
are not (or are not known to be) stronger in the above sense.[12] And Lo has extended the
earlier proofs, arguing that unconditional security is impossible for all one-sided two-party
computations and for many two-sided two-party computations.[13]
To the best of my knowledge, the possibility of combining temporary uncomputabil-
ity assumptions with quantum cryptography has only briefly been considered, in a short
review by Crepeau[14] and in a recent preprint.[15] Crepeau examines the possibility of
improving a quantum bit commitment protocol by a combination of classical bit com-
mitments and temporary computability bounds, and concludes that nothing is gained.
Certainly, if a standard classical bit commitment is used by Bob to check Alice’s honesty
in a standard quantum bit commitment protocol, the protocol becomes as insecure as the
classical protocol, over which it has no advantage.
We describe here two new quantum bit commitment protocols which rely on a tempo-
rary bound on Alice’s computing power but which have a signicant advantage over any
classical protocol, in that if the temporary bound is reliable the schemes are permanently
secure against cheating by either party. They work in two stages. First, Alice supplies Bob
with a large sequence of pure states, chosen randomly from a list of four possibilities. Since
this procedure cannot be guaranteed by sending quantum data alone, she uses classical
bit commitments to guarantee to Bob that she is indeed sending pure states of the right
form. These classical commitments are of a known but not standard type. They are secure
indenitely against Bob: he cannot read them unless Alice unveils them. They are secure
temporarily against Alice: she cannot cheat in unveiling them until she carries out some
temporarily infeasible computation. However, since the classical commitments are used
only for the pure state verication part of the protocol, which takes place in some xed
time interval before commitment, the possibility of Alice’s eventual cheating is irrelevant.
Most of the states sent to Bob are used up in the pure state verication procedure,
but some agreed large number N still remain. For Alice then to commit a bit to Bob,
she supplies him with a code mapping the remaining pure states supplied to him into a
single bit. Even given the code, Bob can obtain no information about the bit. On the
other hand, once she supplies the code, Alice is committed to the bit: her probability of
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successfully cheating by attempting to reveal the opposite bit decreases exponentially to
zero with N .
For Bob to commit a bit to Alice, he carries out one of two alternative classes of
operations on the pure states supplied to him. Again, Alice can obtain no information
about the bit, and Bob’s probability of cheating decreases exponentially with N .
By using quantum information, permanent two-sided security in bit commitment can
thus be obtained from a temporary one-sided computational bound.
2. Pure state verication
Suppose that Bob is condent that Alice is computationally bounded | she cannot
solve NP problems in polynomial time, for example | but Alice cannot condently assign
any bound on Bob’s computational power. Perhaps he has a powerful quantum computer
using technology unknown to her, and is known to have a team of clever programmers
working secretly on ecient quantum algorithms. Alice nonetheless wants to commit a bit
to Bob. Perhaps surprisingly at rst sight, there exist classical bit commitment schemes
which allow her to do so without any risk that Bob will read the bit until she unveils it,
while allowing Bob to be condent that she cannot cheat in unveiling the bit so long as
her computational bound holds good. (Variants can be found in Refs. [16,17,18,19].) In
other words, the schemes are unconditionally secure against Bob; they are secure against
Alice, conditional on her computational bound.1
Such schemes allow Alice to provide Bob with a stream of qubits which are guaranteed
to be pure states of a prescribed form | a very useful procedure that perhaps should be
considered a basic quantum cryptographic protocol in its own right. The general method
will be clear from the following simple example, which, as we will see, is adequate for
implementing secure bit commitment protocols in both directions.














so that j1i = U2j0i. Alice sends Bob a sequence of qubits, randomly chosen to be in one
of the four pure states j0i; U j0i; U2j0i; U3j0i.
1 I am very grateful to Andras Bodor and Dominic Mayers for very helpful discussions and
explanations of these points.
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Given that the qubits are actually pure states chosen from this list, rather than al-
ternative pure states or surreptitiously entangled states, it will be in Alice’s interest to
ensure that they are chosen randomly, so that this need not be separately guaranteed.
However, Alice needs to guarantee to Bob that she is sending pure states of the right form,
without giving him any information about any specic pure states that are to be used for
bit commitment. She does this by sending, with each qubit, two classically committed bits
which | when unveiled | identify the qubit according to some agreed cipher: 00; 01; 10; 11
correspond to j0i; U j0i; U2j0i; U3j0i respectively, let us say. The qubits and the classical
commitments are labelled, so that Bob knows which pair of classical commitments is sup-
posed to identify any given qubit. The classical commitments are made using a scheme
of the type described above, so that in particular they are unconditionally secure against
Bob unless unveiled.
Alice and Bob agree rst on some number N of pure states which are actually to
be used for some later quantum protocol | if it is a bit commitment, then N will be
chosen by the receiver of the bit. Bob then stipulates some number NB >> N , and
Alice sends him a total of NB pure states with accompanying classical commitments. Bob
chooses any (NB −N) of the states and asks Alice to unveil her classical commitments for
each of these qubits. He then checks, by carrying out measurements in the appropriate
basis, that the qubits are indeed in the pure states Alice claims. Alternatively, if he is
unable to store the qubits for long enough, he measures them in randomly chosen bases |
j0i; U2j0i or U j0i; U3j0i would suce | and then compares the results of his measurements
statistically against Alice’s claims. Either way, he has chosen NB suciently large that he
will be condent that, if Alice’s claims are veried, any cheating on her part is negligible,
in the sense that any later quantum protocol to be carried out using the remaining N
states will be negligibly insecure.
If Alice’s claims pass this test, Bob accepts that she is supplying pure states of the
agreed form; if they fail, he abandons the protocol, having given nothing away. The
classical bit commitments corresponding to the remaining N states are never used: Alice
will never be called upon to unveil them. Thus, the fact that she will eventually be able
to cheat these classical commitments | since she will presumably eventually be able to
carry out the necessary computation | is irrelevant so far as security is concerned.
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3. Quantum bit commitment by Alice
Suppose now that Alice and Bob have followed the pure state verication protocol
successfully. Bob has a collection of N qubits supplied by Alice, and he accepts that each
of them is in one of the four specied pure states. Alice now uses all N qubits to commit
a single bit to Bob, as follows. For each state, she gives Bob a separate cipher relating 0; 1
to the two possible bases j0i; U2j0i and U j0i; U3j0i | that is, for each state, she tells Bob
either (C0) that 0 corresponds to the rst basis and 1 to the second, or (C1) vice versa.
Her choice of cipher depends on the pure state and the bit she wants to commit: if she
wants to commit a, and the state is of the form Unj0i, then for that state she gives him
cipher Cn+a, the sum being taken modulo 2.
Bob now knows that, if Alice is following the protocol to commit the bit a, and
supplies cipher Cb for a given qubit, then it is one of the two states U
a+bj0i; Ua+b+2j0i.
However, this gives him no useful information about the bit, as the states were chosen
randomly: for each qubit, the density matrices corresponding to a 0 and a 1 are identical.
The commitment is thus unconditionally secure against Bob.
To unveil her commitment, Alice tells Bob the precise state of each qubit. If Bob has
stored the qubits, he now checks that the states are indeed as Alice claims. Otherwise
he tests her claims statistically against measurements he previously carried out: again,
it would suce for him to carry out these measurements in bases chosen randomly to be
either j0i; U2j0i or U j0i; U3j0i. He checks also that her unveiled states all correspond with
the same bit via the ciphers Alice supplied. If Alice’s claims pass these tests, Bob accepts
that the bit was genuinely committed.
Alice cannot cheat via any quantum attack, since the pure states supplied to Bob are
known to be (to a very good approximation) disentangled from any other system, and in
particular from anything under Alice’s control. Her probability of successfully cheating by
lying to Bob about the states supplied to him becomes exponentially small as N increases.
The scheme is thus secure against Alice, conditional only on the assumption that the pure
state verication protocol was secure | i.e. on the temporary computational bound on
which that protocol relies.
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4. Quantum bit commitment by Bob
Given a supply of pure states of the prescribed form, Bob can securely commit a bit
to Alice by the following protocol.
Bob carries out one of two alternative procedures, depending on whether he wants to
commit a 0 or 1. To commit a 0, he selects independent random unitary maps, chosen from
the two operations 1 and U2, each with probability 1=2. He then performs one of these
randomly chosen operations on each of the states supplied by Alice. To commit a 1, he rst
carries out von Neumann measurements on each of the supplied states, projecting them
onto a state in the basis fj0i; j1ig. He then selects random unitary maps, as before, and
performs these unitary operations on each of the states resulting from the measurements.
Finally, in either case, he returns the outcome states j Bi i to Alice. They are labelled in
sequence, so that Alice knows which returned state is supposed to correspond to each of
the states he originally sent. Alice may either carry out measurements on the returned
states immediately or, if her technology allows, store them for later measurement.
To reveal the committed bit, Bob simply hands over all the data about the operations
he carried out, telling Alice which unitary operations were chosen for each state, and
| if a 1 was committed | the results of his measurements. In either case, since Alice
knows the states she initially supplied, these data allow her to work out the precise states
which Bob claims to have returned to him. If she has stored the states, she can then
verify, state by state, that all the states are as Bob claims; if she has already carried out
measurements, she can check that the measurement statistics are consistent with Bob’s
claims. If Bob claims to have committed a 1, Alice also checks that the results he reports
are statistically consistent with the random states she prepared. If the data Bob supplies
pass these various checks, Alice accepts that the bit originally committed was as Bob
claims. If not, the protocol has failed. As with any other bit commitment protocol, Alice
then must assume either that Bob tried to cheat, or else that noise or some improbable
statistical fluctuation ruined the protocol.
For a proof of the security of this protocol, see Ref. [15]
5. Comments
By using quantum information, two-sided permanent security in bit commitment can
be obtained from a one-sided temporary computational bound. The scheme presented is
relatively simple and perfectly practical with present technology.
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Of course, the scheme relies on the existence of some reliable computational bound.
It is generally believed that such bounds can presently condently be assumed. There
seems little possibility that all relevant computational bounds will become untrustworthy
through any advances in technology presently envisaged. It is perhaps worth remarking,
though, that secure random bit commitments made at present constitute a resource against
this contingency. Any parties who have carried out secure random bit commitments in
the past can, provided that those commitments remain unveiled, use them at any time in
the future to carry out secure information-carrying bit commitments. To commit a binary
message to Bob, Alice simply needs to add it to a previously committed random string
and send Bob the result, identifying the bits which contain the random string, but not the
string itself: she can then unveil the message at any later time by unveiling the random
string bits.
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